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COMMENT
A Critical Review of the Justice Department's 1988
Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations
I. Introduction
On November 10, 1988 the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or
Department) released the final draft of its Antitrust Guidelines for
International Operations (1988 Guidelines).' This is the culmina-
tion of a two and a half year review2 conducted by the Department to
expand and update its 1977 guidelines (1977 Guide).3 This Com-
ment examines the changes in form and substance proposed by the
Department, compares these changes to those suggested by critics of
the 1977 Guide,4 and offers a few suggestions for improving the new
guidelines further.
A comparison of the two guidelines is important for several rea-
sons. First, it shows how the purpose, structure, and style of Depart-
ment guidelines have changed over time. Second, the 1977 Guide
and the 1988 Guidelines are paradigms for studying the effect the
Chicago School has had on DOJ antitrust policy over the last dec-
I ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS (Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 54, No. 1391, at S-I (Nov. 17, 1988). On June 8, 1988 the
Department released a draft of the guidelines for general review and comment before
preparation of the final document. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (June 8, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 DRAFT], re-
pinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 54, No. 1369, at S-I (June 9, 1988).
2 Division Hires Consultant to Revise Guide for International Operations, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 1247, at 72 (jan 9, 1986); Antitrust Division Unveils
Revisions of Guide for International Operations, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 54,
No. 1369, at 1018 (June 9, 1988).
3 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 GUIDE], reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 799, at E-I (Feb. 1, 1977).
4 Several authors have debated the merits of the 1977 Guide: Seki, TheJustice Depart-
nient's New Antitrust Guide for International Operations-A Sumina and Evaluation, 32 Bus. LAW.
1633 (1977); Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 17
VA. J. INT'L L. 645 (1977); Griffin, A Critique of the justice Departnient u Antitrust Guide for Inter-
national Operations, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215 (1978); Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A
Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255 (1978); Silverstein, The Antitrust Guide For International
Operations-Another Point of View, 13 INT'L LAW. 693 (1979); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COM-
MON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 1986).
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ade.5 Third, the two guides help in isolating and analyzing the polit-
ical aspects of international antitrust policy-the 1977 Guide was an
early major statement by the Carter Administration on antitrust
while the 1988 Guidelines are the Reagan Administration's final pol-
icy. Fourth, the two documents highlight Department trends and
provide a glimpse of the future for international antitrust.
II. Changes In Form
The basic organization of the 1988 Guidelines is the same as
that of the 1977 Guide. There are two main parts, an overview por-
tion giving general guidance, 6 and illustrative cases 7 giving specific
examples of how the overview's policies are applied. The overview
sections of both the 1977 Guide and the 1988 Guidelines describe
the purpose of the guidelines, the applicable antitrust laws enforced
by the DOJ,. enforcement policy, jurisdictional considerations, fac-
tors affecting DOJ's discretion in asserting jursidiction, and foreign
sovereign compulsion. The 1988 Guidelines, however, offer one
more topic, international trade friction and the U.S. trade laws. The
1988 Guidelines break out each topic much more neatly under sepa-
rate headings and cover the subjects in greater depth. This is more in
keeping with the style of the Department's Merger Guidelines8 which
commentators have said is a good example of a relatively clear,
straight-forward exposition of DOJ policy. 9
The structure of the illustrative cases is basically unchanged in
the 1988 Guidelines. Each one consists of a short fact pattern fol-
lowed by a discussion section which analyzes the facts in light of poli-
cies described in the overview. The cases are not simply a rework of
the material in the overview; as in the 1977 Guide, these examples
often provide as much or more new information about Department
policy as the overview itself.' 0
5 The 1988 Guidelines' initiator was Douglas H. Ginsburg then the Assistant Attor-
ney General for the Antitrust Division and a noted defender of the Chicago School. The
Assistant Attorney General hired Professor Diane P. Wood as a special consultant to over-
see the project while on leave from the University of Chicago where she taught Antitrust
and International Antitrust. Division Hires Consultant to Revise Guide for International Opera-
tions, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 1247, at 72 (Jan. 9, 1986).
6 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-l; 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-3.
7 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-3; 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-24.
8 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (June 14, 1984),
reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4491-4495.
9. See Seki, supra note 4, at 1635-36. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 645-46.
lo The examples are of the typical "straw-man" Variety which tends to make them
overly simplistic and unrealistic. Nevertheless, they serve fairly well as illustrations of pol-
icy. The 1988 Guidelines are more formal than the 1977 Guide (e.g. no silly names are
used for corporations-letter designations such as Beta Company or Product X are used
instead). See Seki, supra note 4, at 1635. The breadth and depth of the examples combined
with the much improved overview should answer concerns about the guidelines' utility.
See id. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 645-46.
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III. Changes In Substance
The 1977 Guide was "intended to help businesses plan transac-
tions which the Department of Justice is not likely to challenge, and
to see which transactions are likely to require detailed factual inquiry
by the enforcement agencies."'' The guide was a statement of DOJ
policy, not all government agencies enforcing antitrust policy, such
as the Federal Trade Commission or the International Trade Com-
mission. 12 The 1977 Guide's policies did not apply to private, state,
and foreign antitrust actions. 13 The vagueness about the role of the
1977 Guide in overall antitrust policy was criticized as being
unnecessary. 14
The purpose of the 1988 Guidelines is basically unchanged from
the earlier document. 15 The 1988 Guidelines are more careful to
note that other agencies may have different policies' 6 and also to
highlight that DOJ policies do not apply to private, state, and foreign
antitrust actions. 17 It is unlikely DOJ could do much more to clarify
the reach of its policies without actually issuing its guidelines in a
coordinated fashion with guidelines from all the other relevant agen-
cies-a massive undertaking that would be far beyond the scope of
the current project.
Of greater importance is the nonbinding nature of the policies
1' 1977 GuIDE, supra note 3, at E-1.
12 Griffin, supra note 4, at 217. The 1977 Guide tended to use language which made
it appear to be an all-encompassing statement of federal policy. "[Wie try here to provide
a working statement of government enforcement policy .... 1977 GuIDE, supra note 3, at
E-I (emphasis added). "This [guide] is intended to help business plan transactions which
the Department ofJustice is not likely to challenge, and to see which transactions are likely
to require detailed factual inquiry by the enforcement agencies .... Id. (emphasis added).
"Antitrust enforcement by the United States Government has two major purposes . I... Id. at
E-2 (emphasis added).
The FTC and ITC may, in fact, be of greater concern to the average business. The
number of antitrust cases brought by the government has decreased dramatically in the
last thirty years to only a handful per year. On the other hand, at the end of 1987 the ITC
had seventy-one dumping cases, forty-four Section 337 cases, and eighteen countervailing
duty cases. Baker, The Proper Role for Antitrust in a Not-let-Global Environment, 9 CARDoZo L.
REV. 1135, 1142-43 (1987).
13 This was a criticism of the 1977 Guide by Griffin. Griffin, supra note 4, at 220.
14 Griffin, supra note 4, at 217.
15 The Department has stated that one of the purposes is "to ensure that uncertainty
about enforcement policy does not cause businesses to limit unobjectionable transactions
or to avoid efficient arrangements that benefit consumers." .ew Guidelines on International
Antitrust Enforment Issued byJnstice Department, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) Vol. 5, No. 46, at
1542 (Nov. 28, 1988).
16 The 1988 Guidelines do not explicitly state in the body of the text that other en-
forcement agencies may have different policies or guidelines. They do, however, mention
FTC jurisdiction in a footnote. 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3 n.4. The 1988 Guidelines
avoid the use of ambiguous terms found in the 1977 Guide.
17 The 1988 Guidelines state, "[T]hese Guidelines do not express any view regarding
the applicability of the laws of other nations." 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3. The 1988
Guidelines also advise that "readers should separately evaluate the risk of private litigation
by competitors, consumers, and suppliers, as well as the risk of enforcement by state pros-
ecutors under state and federal antitrust laws." Id. at S-3.
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stated in the 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines. This has been called
economically inefficient 8 and misleading. 19 To be sure, the 1988
Guidelines are much more detailed and thorough than the 1977
Guide, 2° yet the new guidelines still reserve the Justice Department's
right to ignore any or all of the guidelines' considerations when ex-
pedient.2 1 This point is reemphasized by the change in titles from
"Guide" in 1977 to "Guidelines" in 1988.22
A. Relevant Antitrust Laws
The first subsection of the 1988 Guidelines' overview is titled
"Relevant Antitrust Laws." 23 In the 1977 Guide the equivalent sub-
section, called "Applicable Antitrust Laws," 24 only gave a sketchy
description of the Sherman Act 25 and the Webb-Pomerene Act. 2 6 27
The 1988 Guidelines give a similar, albeit somewhat more generic,
definition of the Sherman 28 and Webb-Pomerene Acts,2 1' but also in-
18 Silverstein, supra note 4, at 699 ("The key ... is a willingness on the part of the
Justice Department, not presently evident, to make binding advance determinations of the
legality of certain kinds of proposed transactions so businesses could operate within the
framework of relatively fixed guidelines."). See also id. at 694. Silverstein does note, how-
ever, that the Antitrust Division has a "Business Review Procedure," 28 CFR § 50.6
(1988), but points out several problems with this including:
delays of six weeks or more in obtaining a response, drawing attention to a
transaction which might otherwise escape notice, public disclosure of the re-
view letter, and, most significantly, the fact that a "clearance" from the Jus-
tice Department under this procedure creates no immunity from subsequent
prosecution even if the actual transaction is exactly as described.
Id.
19) Griffin, supra note 4, at 219. Nevertheless, Griffin goes on to state, "The Guide's
nonbinding nature is obviously reasonable in light of the accepted rule that one govern-
inent administration's antitrust enforcement policy does not bind a subsequent adminis-
tration and in light of the evolving nature of the law in the international business area."
Id. at 220. Compare Silverstein, supra note 4, at 694 and note 18, supra.
20 The 1988 Guidelines are nearly three times as long as the 1977 Guide, contain
four more illustrative cases than the 1977 Guide, and more than double the number of
footnotes.
21 "These Guidelines are intended only to provide general guidance as to how the
Department analyzes certain commonly occurring issues affecting its own enforcement de-
cisions." 1988 GUIDE, .upra note 1, at S-3. "[T]hese Guidelines are not intended to be a
restatement of the law .... Id. "[Allthough these Guidelines should improve the pre-
dictability of the Department's enforcement policy ..., it is not possible to remove the
exercise ofjudgment from the evaluation of conduct.., and the determination whether to
assert jurisdiction ...." Id. at S-3.
22 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "guide" as "to direct, super-
vise, or influence usually to a particular end" whereas "guideline" is "an indication or
outline (as by a government) of policy or conduct."
2 t 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-3.
24 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-1.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
27 The bulk of the subsection described how the rule-of-reason approach might vary
in the international context and reemphasized the importance of the particular facts of
each situation. Both of these points fit more naturally under the next subsection "Enforce-
ment Policies," which is where the 1988 Guidelines placed them.
28 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-3.
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clude the Clayton Act 30 and Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 197631 32 as
well as two newer laws, the National Cooperative Research Act of
1984 (NCRA) 33 and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETC
Act). 34 Finally, in a footnote the Wilson Tariff Act3 5 is mentioned
almost pro forma as being essentially parallel in language and coex-
tensive in scope to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 6
The 1988 Guidelines state in an introductory footnote37 that in
addition to the laws described which the Department enforces, there
are applicable laws which may be enforced by the FTC: the Federal
Trade Commission Act38 and the Robinson-Patman Act 39 -the 1977
Guide was criticized for omitting these.40 It seems logical that since
two exemptions to DOJ enforcement are described (the Webb-
Pomerene Act and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982),
others probably should be at least footnoted, for example the Ship-
ping Act of 1984. 4 1 42
Neither the 1977 Guide nor the 1988 Guidelines state how
much enforcement effort is placed behind each law. For both theo-
retical and practical reasons it isn't wise for the Department to be too
explicit on this point, at least in the guidelines. Nonetheless, the
amount of emphasis placed on various statutes is markedly different.
For example, it has been claimed that section 7 of the Clayton Act
has been essentially abandoned because of the Chicago School's phi-
losophy,43 while the Department has renewed interest in pursuing
price-fixing and bid rigging. 44 In lieu of DOJ direction, legal counsel
21)Id. at S-5.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 25 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) discussed in 1988 GUIDE,supra note 1,
at S-4.
31 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982) discussed in 1988 GuIDE, supra note 1, at S-4.
32 Both the Clayton Act and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act should have been included in
the 1977 Guide.
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (Supp. IV 1986) discussed in 1988 GUIDE, Supra note 1, at
S-4 to S-5.
34 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4053 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) discussed in 1988 GUIDE, supra
note 1, at S-5.
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982).
36 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3 n.5.
37 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-3 n.4.
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
39 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4( Griffin, supra note 4, at 217-19 ("it 'does not describe the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's [FTC's] enforcement policies [and] . . . does not deal with either the Federal Trade
Commission Act or the Clayton Act, as administered by the FTC.' "footnote omitted).
41 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1720 (West Supp. 1987).
42 In all fairness, the Department did state that it was limiting its discussion to major
legislation. The number of potential exemptions that could have been included is quite
large, for example: insurance, banking, farm associations, and even baseball.
43 "After sifting through cases, enforcement performance, and rhetoric, one must
conclude that Chicago is very close to accomplishing de facto repeal of Clayton 7, if not
antitrust." Austin, Antitrust Reaction To The ileiger Wave. The Revolution I's. The Counter'evolu-
tion, 66 N.C.L. REv. 931, 961 (1988).
44 Adler, Hands-Off Antitrust Polic Likely to End, ll'hoever Wins the Presidential Election,
1989]
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must stay in the habit of looking beyond the guidelines for the cur-
rent status of various laws and policies.
B. Enforcement Policy
The 1977 Guide and 1988 Guidelines both follow their descrip-
tions of applicable antitrust laws with a subsection called "Enforce-
ment Policy."'45 The similarities between the two documents end at
the title, however. The 1977 Guide's Enforcement Policy subsection
consists ofjust three paragraphs. In them, the Department describes
the two main purposes of antitrust laws in an international context:
(1) "protect the American consuming public by assuring it the bene-
fit of competitive products and ideas produced by foreign competi-
tors as well as domestic competitors, ' 4" and (2) "protect American
export and investment opportunities against privately imposed
restrictions. ' 4 7
The 1988 Guidelines replace these paragraphs with a similar
general discussion of competition, market power, and the role of per
se and rule-of-reason analysis.48 But, the 1988 Guidelines then go
on to give a detailed, fourteen-page description of the Department's
method for analyzing the competitive effects of specific acts. 49 Six
topics are covered: criminal offenses under the Sherman Act, 51° mo-
nopolization, 51 mergers, 52 joint ventures, 53 vertical nonprice distri-
bution restraints, 54  and intellectual property licensing
arrangements. 55
1. Criminal Offenses Under the Sherman Act
The 1988 Guidelines makes it clear that any naked restraint of
trade 56 is prosecuted as a criminal violation of the Sherman Act. 5 7
No express agreements or overt acts are necessary58 and any form of
Wall St.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at BI, col. 3 (citing comment by Antitrust Division head, Charles
F. Rule, that the administration has been particularly tough in enforcing these laws).
45 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2; 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-5.
46 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2.
47 Id.
48 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-5 to S-6.
49i Id. at S-7 to S-20.
50 1988 GUIDE, supra nole 1. at S-7.
51 Id.
52 Id. at S-8.
53 Id. at S-I1.
54 Id. at S-14.
55 Id. at S-16.
56 An agreement is "naked" if its sole purpose and effect is to restrict output
and/or raise (or depress) price-that is, if it is not plausibly related to some
economic integration of the parties' operations (beyond simply the coordina-
tion of price and/or output) that may result in increased production.
1988 DRAFt, supra note 1, at S-7.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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price coordination is illegal59 regardless of whether the agreement is
successful in creating an anticompetitive effect. 60
This is identical to the analysis used in domestic cases; 6 1 the
only significant contribution over the 1977 Guide is that all this is
explicitly stated. In the 1977 Guide, for example, although the per
se illegality of price fixing was mentioned, its criminal nature and the
test for its illegality were not. 6 2 The 1977 Guide did provide some
insight through three illustrative cases, 63 but essentially the analyses
used were the same as those now in the 1988 Guidelines.
2. Monopolization
According to the 1988 Guidelines, unlawful monopolization
consists of the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power. 64 The
three elements of attempt to monopolize are specific intent to mo-
nopolize, anticompetitive acts, and a dangerous probability of suc-
cess. 65 These definitions hold no surprises; they are identical to
domestic analyses of monopolization. 66 In the only real reference to
international operations, DOJ highlights the two cases where mo-
nopolization or attempt to monopolize are most likely to occur: (1)
when a foreign firm sells a product at predatory prices in the United
States; and (2) when U.S.-based firms stymie foriegn imports
59 For example, naked agreements among competitors to raise their individual
prices by a specified amount, to maintain a specified profit margin, to adopt a
standard formula for computing price, or to notify one another before reduc-
ing price are also criminal violations of section I of the Sherman Act.
Id.
6) Id.
61 See generally P. AREEDA, VI ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATIONS (1986).
62 Certain types of agreements are regarded as illegal per se-including, most
notably, agreements among competitors to fix prices at which their offerings
are sold, or to allocate territories or customers in order to avoid competing
with each other. This is done because experience generally has established
that such agreements' "pernicious effect on competition and lack of any re-
deeming virtue" makes an "elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm [that
individual restraints] have caused or the business excuse for their use" gen-
erally not worth the effort.
1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-1 quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
63 In Case A, the Department reiterated the Supreme Court position in Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. U.S. that naked territorial restraints between U.S. and foreign manufacturers
are per se illegal. 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951), cited in 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-4. In
Case K, the Department states that a U.S. manufacturer is guilty of horizontal group boy-
cott if it agrees with other manufacturers, foreign or domestic, to boycott a retailer even if
done under pressure from the government of a foreign nation supplying raw materials. Id.
at E-14 to E-15. Case L deals with a classic horizontal price-fixing cartel with foreign sov-
ereignty overtones. Id. at E-15 to E-16.
(4 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-7.
65 Id.
!; See generally P. AREEDA, III ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND IHEIR APPLICATIONS (1986).
1989]
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through frivolous private actions under U.S. trade laws. The 1988
Guidelines contain one illustrative case, Case 13, which describes the
latter situation.67
Curiously, monopolization and attempts to monopolize were
omitted entirely from the 1977 Guide and the draft revision of the
1988 Guidelines. Possibly this is because there are very few DOJ
prosecutions of these acts.
3. Mergers
The 1977 Guide does not mention mergers in its enforcement
policy subsection, but does discuss them in Case B.68 The guide lists
a four-part test for determining their validity.
[T]he inquiry will be whether (1) the U.S. market (or relevant
local market) is highly concentrated; (2) the foreign firm is by virtue
of its capability of entering the market one of a relatively small
group of potential entrants; (3) the foreign firm has the incentives to
enter the U.S. market; and (4) the foreign firm has the capability of
entering the market or is threatening to enter.
69
This also presumably applied to a merger of a foreign company and
a domestic company or an acquisition of one by the other.
The 1988 Guidelines, in contrast, take their test from the De-
partment's Merger Guidelines70 published in 1984. There are two
basic parts. "The first step in the Department's merger analysis is to
identify the relevant market or markets that would be affected by the
merger and the firms that compete in that market or those mar-
kets."' 7' To define the market the Department tries "to identify a
group of products (the 'product market') and a geographic area (the
'geographic market') with respect to which sellers could exercise
market power if they were able to coordinate their actions so as to act
like a monopolist." 72 In the second step, "[i]f merging firms com-
pete in the same product and geographic markets the Department
next determines whether the elimination of competition between
them would likely create, enhance or facilitate the exercise of market
power." 73 The 1988 Guidelines also suggest several other factors
which may affect the Department's decision to contest a merger or
acquisition.74 Essentially then, the two tests cover the same ground,
67 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-44.
68 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-5.
69 Id.
70 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (June 14,
1984), repiinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,551-20,568.
71 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-9.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 "One such factor is recent or ongoing changes in market conditions." 1988
GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-10. "Another factor is ... a firm's financial condition." Id. "The
Department also considers special factors affecting the competitive significance of foreign
firms, such as government restrictions on imports or foreign export restrictions." Id.
[VOL. 14
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which means no significant changes for business.
In addition, there is not much that is actually unique to interna-
tional operations in the new guidelines. For example, the Depart-
ment states that the analysis "does not discriminate against or in
favor of firms on the basis of their citizenship." 75 Foreign competi-
tors and potential competitors as well as the existence of effective
trade barriers are taken into account when determining market
power, 76 but this would be true for a purely domestic merger.77
Thus merger analysis, whether domestic or international, is about
the same.
The illustrative cases on mergers, Cases 1 through 4, do point
out a growing problem for businesses, however. The cases try to
describe the effects of various trade barriers such as Voluntary Ex-
port Restraints (VERs) and tariffs have on defining the relevant mar-
ket. It is clear from the number and complexity of examples that
determining markets is becoming much more difficult as the variety
and volatility of barriers increases. Although the Department cannot
do anything about the proliferation of arcane market barriers and
must try to define relevant markets regardless of them, this leaves
businesses with a great deal more uncertainty.
Merger policy has been one of the areas most heavily influenced
by the Chicago School. An efficiency analysis dominates, resulting in
far fewer challenges to businesses-not always to the approval of
others. 78 Future merger analysis may move back to a mix of eco-
nomic, social, and political considerations. Robert B. Reich, an ad-
viser to the Democratic Party, has stated that economic analysis
alone is insufficient. Social and political factors must be explicitly
taken into account. 79 Lawrence Summers, another Democratic ad-
"[Tjhe Department also considers the likelihood, timing, and scope of substantial new
entry into the relevant market, the likelihood of expansion by fringe firms, and other fac-
tors (such as heterogeneity of the relevant product and historical market performance)
.... Id.
75 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-10.
76 Id. at S-10 to S-II.
77 See generaly P. AREEDA, II ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATIONS (1986).
78 [During the Reagan Administration] the Antitrust Division was turned over
to ... William F. Baxter .... a devotee of the University of Chicago school of
economics .... Baxter encouraged a merger boom. Business people began
to put together giant combinations that they would not have even considered
before Baxter took over, and the number of huge mergers broke records year
after year, often with government help in designing and facilitating the com-
bination.
Government antitrust enforcement having been effectively halted by
1986, the Antitrust Division decided that the next goal was . . . legislative
reform. This turned out to be a six-bill package weakening the law on merg-
ers, reducing the penalties for a violation, and in general trying to lock into
permanent legislation the Administration's anti-antitrust policies. The bills
went nowhere.
H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS 195-96 (1988).
79 Advisers to Presidential Candidates Differ on Most Aspects of Enforcement, ANTITRUST &
1989]
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viser, also feels that there has not been enough enforcement8 0 But,
Timothy J. Muris, an advisor to the Republican Party, believes that
"[b]y focusing on economic power, you satisfy the social and political
concerns of § 7."81 One neutral authority believes merger policy
"might change under a more liberal administration, but the likeli-
hood is that the changes would be modest and the basic framework
would be left intact."8 2
4. Joint Ventures
This is one of the most important sections of the new guide-
lines. 83 As with mergers, the 1977 Guide did not discuss joint ven-
tures in its Enforcement Policy subsection, but did cover this subject
extensively in Illustrative Cases C,8 4 D,85 E,86 and M. 87 In Case C,
the 1977 Guide listed three elements which generally determine the
legality of joint ventures:
(1) "whether the creation of the joint venture itself unreasona-
bly restrains competition;" 88
(2) "whether the joint venture has any unreasonable collateral
restraints that must be struck down even if the venture is allowed;" 8 9
and
(3) "whether the joint venture is in essence a 'bottleneck mo-
nopoly' which is so important to those in the business that it must be
opened to all on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. 90
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 55, No. 1382, at 449 (Sept. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Presidential
Advisers' Opinions].
8o "Allowing the 18 largest mergers in history to go through without raising ques-
tions almost certainly represents insufficient enforcement." Adler, supra note 45, quoting
Professor Lawrence Summers of Harvard University.
81 Presidential ,ldvisois' Opinions, supra note 79, at 449.
82 Gellhorn, Clinibing the .A ntitrust Staircase, 31 ANITrRusr BULLErIN 341, 348 (1986).
Professor Gellhorn later notes that a worsening international trade picture would, in fact,
help efforts to limit antitrust enforcement of mergers. Id. at 350. Professor Summers con-
curs in this opinion. Adler, supra note 44.
83 "The guidelines treatment of joint research and development ventures and the
joint commercialization of products resulting from those ventures may be of particular
interest to the U.S. business community." Justice Department Releases Updated International
Guide, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 55, No. 1390, at 890 (Nov. 17 1988)
(quoting Charles F. Rule, head of the Antitrust Division of DOJ).
84 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-6.
85 Id. at E-7.
86 Id. at E-8.
87 Id. at E-16.
88 Id. at E-6.
89) Id. The 1977 Guide goes on to note in Case D that "[e]ven where the creation of a
joint venture is legitimate, collateral restrictions may be challenged under the Sherman
Act if they unreasonably restrain competition among the parties to the joinl venture." Id.
at E-7. "A restriction that is not per se illegal will be examined under the so-called 'ancil-
lary restraints' doctrine to see whether such restraint is truly necessary to the legitimate
purpose of the joint venture." Id. (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85
F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
90 1977 GuIDE, supra note 3, at E-6.
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The 1977 Guide then added, "The creation of joint venture of
the more permanent variety will in essence be looked at as if it were a
merger between parties in the field covered by the venture." 91
This test was rather muddled. Step one could have been inter-
preted as making some joint ventures per se unlawful because of the
amount of competition restrainted, regardless of any offsetting
procompetitive efficiencies. It could simply have meant that a bal-
ancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects was to be done. Step two
had the same ambiguities for collateral restraints. Step three did not
seem to address the legality of the joint venture at all, but rather the
scope of participation required of the venture. The fundamental
problem with the whole test was the total lack of detail on how the
"unreasonableness" standard was actually implemented.
The 1988 Guidelines go a good bit further toward solving this
problem. Most importantly, the Department downplays a per se un-
lawful analysis for true joint ventures. "Because joint ventures typi-
cally acheive integrative efficiencies, the Department judges the
likely competitive effects of joint ventures under a rule of reason." 92
This involves a four-step test somewhat different than the one out-
lined in the 1977 Guide.
"First, the Department determines whether the joint venture
would likely have any anticompetitive effect in the market or markets
in which the joint venture proposes to operate or in which the eco-
nomic integration of the parties occurs .... Second, the Department
determines whether the joint venture would likely have an anticom-
petitive effect in any other market or markets ('spill-over market(s)')
in which the joint venture members are actual or potential competi-
tors outside the joint venture. Third, the Department analyzes the
likely competitive effects of any nonprice vertical restraints imposed
in connection with the joint venture."9 :3 "If . . . the Department's
analysis under the first three steps reveals significant anticompetitive
risks, then, under step 4, the Department considers whether any
procompetitive efficiences that the parties claim would be acheived
by the joint venture would outweigh the risk of anticompetitive
harm." 94
The first step's analysis concentrates on the venture's effect on
independent decision making by participants in the joint venture
market.9 5 If the members of the joint venture do not currently par-
ticipate in the market and are not considered potential competitors
in that market then there can be no threat. If the members are par-
9 ' Id.
92 1988 GuIDE, supra note I, at S- 11.
93 Id.
94 Id. at S-I I to S-12.
95 Id. at S-12.
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ticipants in the market then the Department looks at the increase in
their market power using much the same techniques as for merg-
ers. 96 This includes defining the market, calculating market concen-
tration, and examining offsetting factors like ease of entry. Unlike
mergers, joint ventures are given wide latitude when analyzed be-
cause they operate for a limited time or can more easily be undone.9 7
The 1988 Guidelines' second step, analysis of spill-over markets,
is barely touched upon by the 1977 Guide. 98 According to the 1988
Guidelines, an active inquiry into this area is now made when analyz-
ing joint ventures.9 9 But, "[t]he use of effective safeguards may...
eliminate the need to conduct an elaborate structural analysis of the
spill-over market."' 00 If conditions in the spill-over market make
successful collusion unlikely, the Department again does not investi-
gate further.' 0 ' If market characteristics show the potential for an-
ticompetitive effects, the Department weighs the restraint against the
effect to determine whether it must be disallowed. This is, once
again, a pure rule of reason approach reflecting the Chicago School
perspective that spill-over effects cannot be anticompetitive per se
and that there should be a presumption that these sorts of restraints
are more beneficial than not.
The third step is to check for vertical nonprice restraints to be
used by venture members. There is a potential for anticompetitive
effects at either the primary or the secondary levels of the market,
just as any business entity could cause.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 The only places spill-over markets conic into play in the 1977 Guide are in Illustra-
tive Cases C and D. "Any joint venture among competitors involves some antitrust risk
that the cooperation may spill over into other areas. Accordingly the parties should use
special care in policing the operations of a joint venture .... 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at
E-6. "The Department obviously cannot police each research joint venture to ensure that
production and marketing are not also discussed. Of course, in appropriate cases the De-
partment may wish to make subsequent inquiries to confirm that the ... collaboration has
not extended into other areas." Id. at E-8.
9 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-12.
100 Id. at S-13. "Examples of safeguards ...include ...a requirement that certain
types of sensitive business information be disclosed only to neutral third parties, a require-
ment that meetings involving representatives of the venture members be monitored by
knowledgeable counsel, or a requirement that accurate and complete records of such dis-
cussions be maintained." Id.
The Department also cited a variety of other sources of examples in footnote 98:
"The Antitrust Division's Approach to Shippers' Associations," Remarks of Charles F.
Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Before the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Oct. 21, 1985 (setting forth guidelines for
assessing the competitive effect of shipping associations); ETC Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at
1794-1796 (discussing, inter alia, conditions of certification relating to exchange of com-
petitively sensitive information).
tot id. at S-13, citing Letter from William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, to Irving B. Yoskowitz, Vice President and General Counsel, United Tech-
nologies Corp., Oct. 27, 1983 (identifying disincentives to collusion among joint venture
participants in spill-over markets.)
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
The fourth step makes it clear that the 1988 Guidelines' test is a
balancing between pro- and anticompetitive effects. If the joint ven-
ture members can show that despite any anticompetitive effects dis-
covered under steps one through three, there are more
procompetitive effects then the venture will be permitted to proceed.
Note that the Department does not completely reject the per se
unlawful concept. DOJ recognizes that naked agreements to restrain
price or output are still per se unlawful regardless of whether they
are labelled "joint ventures."'' 02 Thus there is actually a zeroeth step
to the Department's analysis: whether the agreement is, in fact, a
naked price or output agreement.
A direct comparison between the 1977 Guide's test and the
1988 Guidelines' test is difficult. Essentially, the 1988 Guidelines
collapse the first two elements of the 1977 Guide's test then break
them back out into the four step analysis. This treats the joint ven-
ture and ancillary restraints in an identical, parallel fashion while cre-
ating a more detailed analytical framework.
Overall, the 1988 Guidelines on joint ventures are still vague;
there are no explicit safe harbors. In theory, a joint venture by com-
panies which have not previously participated in the relevant market
is safe. Nevertheless, the definition of the relevant market and par-
ticipation in that market are flexible enough to trap joint ventures
which might appear safe to the venture members. Presumably, an-
other safe harbor is a joint venture which leaves the relevant market
with an HHI of less than one thousand, but this is not clearly stated
in the guidelines.
Joint venture participants do have reason to be optimistic
though. This is an area in which both political parties seem to agree
that a hands-off approach is warranted. Both parties believe that in-
dustrial competitiveness is becoming such an important social con-
cern that antitrust policy must be adapted. Attorney General
Thornburgh has proposed an exemption certification process fi la
the ETC Act for joint production ventures and an elimination of
triple damage penalties for these actions. 10 3 Although the Demo-
crats generally agree there is a need for improvement, if the U.S.
position in the world economy improved markedly, there might be a
renewed interest in tougher enforcement.l10 4
5. Vertical Nonprice Distribution Restraints
Vertical restraints have most obviously been affected by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
102 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S- 11.
10W' Thornburgh, U.S. Firms Get Tripped in Race to the Marketplace: Grant Antitrust Exemp-
lions, Wall St.J., Dec. 27, 1988, at AI0, col. 4.
104 See Gellhorn, supra note 82, at 350.
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Inc., 105 which approves of these restraints in some situations. The
1977 Guide was released just before this decision and described the
Department's pre-Sylvania position in Illustrative Case J.' 0 6 In that
example, the Department relied on United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. 107 to assert that "terminating a domestic distributor who resells
to customers in [a newly recruited] foreign distributor's territory may
adversely affect the distributor's export opportunities"' 10 8 and be il-
legal. This is only true, per se, if the domestic manufacturer and the
new foreign distributor are also competitors who had divided sales
territories. Any other sort of arrangement was to be analyzed by the
Courts under a rule of reason approach.' 0 9
The 1988 Guidelines acknowledge this I 10 but specify three nar-
rower conditions necessary for a vertical nonprice restraint to cause
collusion: "(i) the [primary] market ... must be ... highly concen-
trated ... ; (ii) firms in the [secondary] market ... using or subject to
the restraints . . . must account for most sales in that market; (iii)
entry into the primary market must be difficult."''' The 1988
Guidelines also list three similar conditions which may lead to exclu-
sion of rivals from the market by denying them access to necessary
inputs or facilities: "(i) the market in which the firms imposing the
restraint operate must be . . . very highly concentrated and leading
firms . . . must use the restraint . . . ; (ii) the restraints must cover
most of the capacity of the market... ; (iii) entry into the 'foreclosed'
market must be difficult."' 12 The Department then lays out a two-
step process for analyzing these situations. First, the Department
takes a "quick look" at the degree of concentration in the relevant
markets and at the market shares of firms employing the restraint to
determine whether the restraint could plausibly have an anticompeti-
tive effect.' ' 3 In most cases, the minimum necessary conditions will
not exist. If these conditions do exist, however, the Department con-
105 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (location restraint imposed on franchisees by franchisor is to be
judged under the rule of reason).
106 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-13.
107 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
108 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-13 n.79.
109 See generally Fugate, supra note 4, at 778-80.
1 10 "Because vertical nonprice restraints hold significant potential for generating
procompetitive efficiencies, the Department analyzes such restraints under a rule of rea-
son." 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-14.
I I ld. This is an improvement over the 1977 Guide which was criticized for lacking a
description of specific factors for determining whether anticompetitive effects were possi-
ble. Griffin, supra note 4, at 229.
It's interesting to note the change in wording from the draft to the final copy. The
test for collusion goes from lenient to very lenient. For example, "The primary level of the
market must be ... concentrated;" becomes "highly concentrated;" "firms at the secondary
level using the restraint must account for a large portion of the sales... ;- becomes ",most
sales."
112 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-15.
11t Id.
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siders other relevant factors.' 14 The end result is that under the
1988 Guidelines vertical nonprice restraints which would have failed
under the 1977 Guide easily pass muster, despite the fact that both
guides say they use a rule of reason analysis.
The Department relies heavily on its Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines, published in 1985, for enforcement policy in this area.' 15 The
Vertical Restraints Guidelines were roundly criticized by Congress as
being a poor reflection of the state of the law at the time the Guide-
lines were released.' 16 Democratic Party advisor Robert Reich has
said the Reagan Administration went too far in permitting vertical
restraints without expressly considering their potential horizontal
anticompetitiveness."1 7 Herman Schwartz criticizes the use of rule-
of-reason analysis in this area as causing too much uncertainty.' 18
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that a lenient posture
towards vertical nonprice restraints is probably justified., 19 Given
this endorsement, this policy is far less likely to change with a differ-
ent administration than, for example, merger policy.
6. Intellectual Property Licensing Arrangements
Intellectual property licensing arrangements were covered by
the 1977 Guide in cases F,120 G, '2 1 H,'12 and I.123 Case F described
enforcement policy for know-how licenses 124 and three common re-
114 Id. These mitigating factors include: whether the restraint has an exclusionary ef-
fect; whether the restraint has survived for a long period; whether the restraint is airtight;
whether market conditions are conducive either to collusion or to anticompetitive exclu-
sion; whether use of the restraint results in significant integrative efficiencies producing
benefits to consumer welfare that outweigh the risk of potential anticompetitive harm; and
whether there is a history of collusion by firms at either level of the market. 1988 GUIDE,
supra note 1, at S-15 to S-16.
115 ANTITRUST DIvISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDE-
LINES (Jan. 23, 1985), repinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 48, No. 1199,
Special Supplement (Jan. 24, 1985). The vertical restraints guidelines are only cited in
footnote 107, but the draft version of the 1988 Guidelines contained roughly the same
substance as the final 1988 Guidelines and noted that the policy was derived directly from
the vertical restraints guidelines. 1988 DRAFT, suipra note 1, at S-10 n.86.
I i See Proposed Senate Resolution LUges Justice To Recall Vertical Restraints Guidelines, ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 49, No. 1224, at 171 (Jul. 18, 1985).
117 PresidentialAdvisers' Opinions, siupra note 79, at 448. DOJ may have been sensitive to
this criticism because vertical restraint analysis had been left out of the draft guidelines for
joint ventures but found their way into the final version.
118 H. SCHWARZ, supra note 78, at 193-94.
I I) "[S]upport for the cartel-facilitating effect of vertical nonprice restraints was and
remains lacking." Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1515,
1520 (1988).
120 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-10.
121 Id. at E-1I.
122 Id. at E-12.
123 Id.
124 "Know-how" is defined as "useful technical information concerning productive ac-
tivity that is not generally known or accessible but is not protected by a patent." 1988
GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-42.
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strictions on them: territorial allocation, product tie-in, and trade-
mark use.
First, the 1977 Guide stated that know-how licenses are subject
to stricter antitrust safeguards than patents because know-how does
not have the protection of the patent system behind it.125 The 1977
Guide then went on to describe factors which made the various re-
straints more or less objectionable. For example, in Case F the for-
eign licensee was barred from exporting products made under the
license to the United States for twenty years. The Department stated
that it would challenge this restraint unless the time theoretically
necessary to reverse-engineer the licensed technology was greater
than twenty years. 126 127
This position was sharply criticized' 28 and has been completely
reversed in the 1988 Guidelines:
Because of the essentially similar roles that know-how transfers and
patent licensing play in the competitive process, the Department
generally analyzes them in the same way. In fact, precisely because
know-how is not statutorily defined and protected by government
grant, restrictions in agreements transferring know-how may be
even more essential to protecting procompetitive investment in val-
uable technology. 12,)
There are two other issues that were mentioned in the 1977
125 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-10.
126 The concept of "time to reverse-engineer" as being the time limit to permit an-
ticompetitive restraints has been called ambiguous and highly impractical:
Aside from the technological difficulties in accurately forecasting when some-
one else can come up with a better mousetrap, there are questions of finan-
cial capability to support the necessary research and development to
successfully complete such a project. Even if a comparable product is devel-
oped independently of the originally licensed product, there are marketing
considerations which have to be overcome, including brand name loyalties
and organization of sales and service outlets ....
Seki, supra note 4, at 1653-54. See also Fugate, supra note 4, at 676.
This concept has been dropped from the 1988 Guidelines. In fact, the 1988 Guide-
lines are in favor of such territorial restrictions. "[Riestrictions such as ... exclusive terri-
tories may be used to encourage the licensee to make investments that are necessary to
develop and promote the licensed technology." 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-16.
127 There are other examples of factors affecting the legitimacy of restraints. With
regard to product tie-ins, the 1977 Guide stated in Cases F and G that tie-ins in other
countries were not policed by the Department unless they substantially affected the ability
of other U.S. exporters to compete as suppliers to that market or affect goods reexported
to the United States. 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-10 and E- 11.
Requiring the use of U.S. trademarks on foreign licensee's products was considered
suspicious according to the 1977 Guide. This restriction could be used in conjunction
with Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1970), to keep these goods
out of the United States.
128 The policy considerations tending toward the Department's current view
are somewhat persuasive, yet common law rights in know-how are being en-
forced continually and, in many cases, are considered on par with patent
rights. There is authority for the proposition that both patents and non-pat-
ented proprietary rights are worthy of equal protection under the law.
Seki, supra note 4, at 1653.
1290 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-42.
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Guide, nonmarket enterprises and grantback licensing. Case H, in
which the 1977 Guide described licensing to nonmarket (state-
owned) enterprises, expressed concern that state-owned businesses
have unfair competitive advantages over domestic firms.' 30 This has
been termed more of a trade issue than an antitrust issue' 3' and
probably for that reason was omitted from the 1988 Guidelines. It
also has a murky economic basis which may have made it an unap-
pealing position to take.
Case I of the 1977 Guide described exclusive grantback licens-
ing. Three scenarios were posed: one in which the domestic com-
pany owned eighty-five percent of the foreign licensee's stock; one in
which the domestic company owned thirty percent of the foreign li-
censee's stock; and one in which the domestic company licensed
technology to an unaffilliated foreign firm.' 32 The Department cited
two factors which influenced the decision to challenge a grantback
under the 1977 guidelines: the scope of the licensee's obligation to
grant back; and the competitive relationship between licensor and
licensee. 133
In the first two proposed scenarios, the Department did not
challenge the grantback under the 1977 guidelines so long as the
domestic company did, in fact, exercise control over the licensee. In
the third scenario, the Department stated that it would challenge the
grantback. Notably, the 1977 Guide cautioned, "The Department
... questions the ... appropriateness of exclusive grantback provi-
sions; and it may in an appropriate case wish to assert that an exclu-
sive grantback requirement involving independent parties is per se
illegal."' 134 This was criticized by observers outside the Depart-
ment 135 and the 1988 Guidelines now state that grantbacks are ana-
lyzed under the rule of reason. 136
The 1988 Guidelines' discussion of grantbacks is found in Case
11.137 The Department's new position is that unless the underlying
technology transfer is a sham, grantbacks can serve important
procompetitive purposes. ' 38 The cumulative competitive effect of all
licensing restrictions is assessed to determine whether the agree-
ment will be challenged.' 39 The Department's analysis tends to be
qualitative, focusing on other substitute technologies available, and
130 1977 GuIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
131 Griffin, supra note 4, at 240.
132 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
133 Id. at E-13.
134 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-12.
135 Fugate, supra note 4, at 678.
136 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-40.
137 Id. at S-39.
138 Id. at S-40 and S-41.
131) Id. at S-40.
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the time needed to bring them to market. 140 Several factors are con-
sidered: whether the product produced using the licensed technol-
ogy has a large or small share of the overall market; whether other
firms possess similar technology; and whether the patents are soon
to expire.141 In general, only grantbacks with extreme anticompeti-
tive effects seem likely to be challenged.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
The next section of both the 1977 Guide and the 1988 Guide-
lines is on subject matter and personal jurisdiction policy. 142
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The 1977 Guide stated, "IT]he U.S. antitrust laws should be ap-
plied to an overseas transaction when there is substantial and fore-
seeable effect on the United States commerce [sic] .... .143 Any
conduct with a "direct or intended effect" on U.S. consumers or ex-
porters is subject to Department scrutiny. 144 There were strong do-
mestic complaints that this antitrust policy was adversely affecting
U.S. export business. 145 In response to this, Congress enacted two
pieces of legislation: The Export Trading Company Act of 1981
(ETC)146 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act
(FTAIA). 147 ETC expands Webb-Pomerene-type antitrust exemp-
tions for U.S. exporters while FTAIA limits Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion' 4 8 over non-import foreign commerce.149-
The 1988 Guidelines reflect this change in their jurisdictional
policy statement. "[Clonduct relating to U.S. import trade that harms
consumers in the United States may be subject to the jurisdiction of
the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct technically
occurs or the nationality of the parties involved."'15 0  However,
under FTAIA, the Department can only pursue those export trade sit-
uations where the conduct results in injury to export business in the
United States. These changes should eliminate concern over possi-
ble adverse effects of antitrust policy on exports. 15 1
140 Id. at S-40 to S-41.
141 Id.
142 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2; 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-20.
143 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-2 to E-3.
144 This is basically the intent and effects test first described in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
145 See generallv J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: ThE SHERMAN ACT VER-
sus U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD (1980).
146 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982).
147 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982).
148 It also limits FTC Act jurisdiction.
149 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-21.
150 Id. at S-20.
151 See generally I B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL. AN-
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Nonetheless, there are several other issues that have been sug-
gested: (1) Should foreclosure of U.S. exporters be enough to war-
rant Department action or should proof of anticompetitive effects in
the United States be necessary? (2) How will foreclosure be mea-
sured? (3) What factors will be weighed when balancing policy be-
tween protection of competition and protection of competitors in
export trade? 152
Unfortunately, the Department provides few answers. The
guidelines cite two circumstances in which DOJ may act: (1) if the
U.S. and foreign markets are highly inelastic and a substantial
number of U.S. firms agree to increase exports in order to reduce
supply and raise price in the United States; (2) if export conduct was
actually intended to affect the price of products in the United
States. 153
The first scenario seems to be just a specific instance of the sec-
ond scenario, not a different class of conduct. 54 The second scena-
rio is just a broad proscription against intent to affect prices or
output.
There is ample room for political interpretation of this policy.
Essentially, it is a protectionist mandate from Congress which may
enable certain classes of exporters to be protected from self-defined
unfair competition. The Department's position is simply a bending
of its will to the political reality that Congress expects to have signifi-
cant input on which exporting industries may be disciplined.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, the Department's stance on
personal jurisdiction has not changed much since the 1977 Guide
was produced. That document asserted, "The general trend of mod-
ern history has been to expand personal jurisdiction of our courts to
reach those who transact business in a certain place, even if they are
not 'found' there in a traditional jurisdictional sense."' 55 The 1988
Guidelines continue to use similar broad language.156
The 1977 Guide was vague on subject matter and personal juris-
diction policy regarding foreign sovereigns. In 1976 Congress had
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 157 which altered and
TITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, ch. 1, at 10-15 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HAWK TREA-
TISE]; Hawk, Antitrust in Today's World Economy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1166 (1988).
152 Hawk, Antitrust in Today's World Economy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1166-67 (1988).
See also generally HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at Vol. 1, ch. 3, pp. 165-71.
153 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-21.
154 Moreover, the effects of the first scenario are just as likely to occur due to in-
dependent business judgment as from a horizontal agreement.
155 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-3.
156 See text accompanying note 150.
157 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
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clarified existing judicial doctrine with respect to standards of immu-
nity, personal jurisdiction, and remedies available against foreign
sovereigns. 158 The 1977 Guide did not mention this law by name.
Rather, it referred to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and noted
that although foreign governments are immune for acts within their
"sovereign" capacity, they may be liable for acts done in their "pro-
prietary" capacity. Later in Illustrative Case L, the 1977 Guide men-
tioned the sovereign immunity defense does not extend to
"commercial" activity and cited FSIA in a footnote.' 59 It is not clear
what distinction the Department meant by using the differing terms
"proprietary" and "commercial." Presumably they were intended to
be interchangeable. It is also surprising that the 1977 Guide seemed
to view the sovereign immunity defense and FSIA as related solely to
personal jurisdiction when, in fact, they also go to subject matter ju-
risdiction. 160 All in all, this portion of the 1977 Guide was not well
constructed.
The 1988 Guidelines cite FSIA directly in the overview and, like
the 1977 Guide's Case L, note that some sovereign actions may be
pursued under exceptions to FSIA, especially the "commercial acts"
exception. In Case 14, the 1988 Guidelines use almost identical lan-
guage as the 1977 Guide to describe how the "commercial act" ex-
ception would be applied't 1 although the subject matter
jurisdiction/personal jurisdiction confusion over FSIA is cleared
up. 162
D. Discretion in Asserting Jurisdiction
The 1988 Guidelines add three subsections not explicitly found
in the 1977 Guide's overview: Factors Affecting the Department's
Discretion in Asserting Jurisdiction;'16 3 Foreign Sovereign Compul-
sion; 164 and International Trade Friction and the U.S. Trade
Laws. 1 5 The 1977 Guide does cover these topics to some degree in
Illustrative Cases K,166 L,167 M,168 and N.'' 9
Discretion in asserting jurisdiction centers around the concept
of comity-"the notion that foreign nations are due deference when
1-8 See HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at Vol. I, ch. 5, p. 566; id. at 569.
1-59 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-15.
160 HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at Vol. I, ch. 5, p. 566 (citing Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5 (1983)).
161 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-45.
162 This is implicit in Illustrative Case 14 because the discussion of personal jurisdic-
tion does not begin until after the discussion of FSIA and sovereign immunity. See id.
163 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-22.
164 Id. at S-23.
165 Id. at S-24.
166 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-14.
167 Id. at E-15.
168 Id. at E-16.
169 Id. at E-17.
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acting within their legitimate spheres of authority."' 70 Comity is an
important public policy underlying two defenses to antitrust actions
in international cases: the act of state doctrine and the foreign sover-
eign compulsion doctrine.
The 1977 Guide discussed comity in Case K. The Guide first
stated that under principles of comity, "the laws of the nation with
the more important national interest at stake, based upon its own
laws and policies, should prevail."'' The 1977 Guide then went on
to say that the U.S. antitrust laws represent "a fundamental and im-
portant national policy."1 72 This begs the questions of exactly what
factors are to be used in weighing competing nations' interests and
what kinds of interests may outweigh those of the United States. Be-
cause other sovereigns will inevitably find their interests more "fun-
damental and important" than our own, the 1977 Guide's policy
causes the very foreign relations tensions that comity is intended to
reduce.
In the years following the release of the 1977 Guide, the Depart-
ment embarked on several antitrust enforcement actions involving
foreign governments. 173 This resulted in diplomatic and political
fallout 17 4 that has led to a careful softening of the Department's
comity policy in the 1988 Guidelines. The Department has now
"committed itself to consider the legitimate interests of other
nations." 175
The basic policy is still the same, a balancing of nations' inter-
ests, but at least the process is clearer.' 7 6 The 1988 Guidelines de-
scribe a two-part test for weighing interests. Before asserting
jurisdiction or seeking remedies, the Department first considers
whether any significant effect will be felt by the foreign nations in-
volved.' 77 If so, six factors are weighed against U.S. consumer wel-
fare loss including the significance of the conduct and effects, and
170 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22.
171 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-15.
172 Id. at E-15.
173 See generally HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at Vol. 1, ch. 1, pp. 22-27.
174 "[Aintitrust has been the chief focus of foreign complaints that application of
United States laws to foreign conduct and persons is inappropriate, if not contrary to in-
ternational law." Id. at 23.
175 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22.
176 In addition, the Department notes that the United States has entered into a series
of agreements with other nations on antitrust enforcement which should further decrease
confusion. Id. See, e.g., Revised Recommendation of the [OECD] Council Concerning Co-
operation Between Member Countries in Restrictive Business Practices Affecting Interna-
tional Trade, OECD Document C (86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986); Agreement Relating to
Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No.
10365, reprinted i [1969-1983 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 50,440; Memorandum
of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the
Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, United States-Canada, reprinted in 5
TRADE REG. REP. 50,464.
177 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22.
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the degree of conflict expected with foreign law. 178 These factors
are still too nebulous for business planning purposes, but serve to
confirm that the Department is taking a more cautious attitude.
Unfortunately, Case 14 in the 1988 Guidelines, which discusses
comity, does not present a good example of the test's application.
As mentioned previously, one of two important defenses to in-
ternational antitrust actions relying on the principle of comity is the
act of state doctrine. It is ajudicially created principle under which a
court refuses to inquire into the validity of acts by a foreign sover-
eign within its own borders. 179
The act of state doctrine received a great deal of attention in the
1977 Guide, but unfortunately the treatment is simplistic and con-
fused. A major part of the confusion occurred because the act of
state doctrine is blended with the foreign sovereign compulsion doc-
trine in the same discussion. Actually, these are separate although
sometimes overlapping concepts. In Cases K and L, the 1977 Guide
recognized the validity of the act of state doctrine and then laid out
what the Department saw as basic limitations on it. First, the doc-
trine only protects foreign government directed activities occurring
in foreign territory, not in the United States.' 80 Second, the activi-
ties must be performed by a truly sovereign entity acting within its
own laws.' 8 ' An agent of the government is not protected. Third,
the doctrine does not apply to commercial activities of a foreign gov-
ernment, only public, political actions.' 82
The 1988 Guidelines mention the act of state doctrine in a pair
of footnotes.' 8 :3 The Department believes that no government ac-
tions should be dismissed by the courts because of considerations of
comity (which would occur through invocation of the act of state
doctrine), although the doctrine should still be applicable to private
actions.' 8 4 The Department's reasoning is simple: the conduct of
178 The actual six factors listed are:
(1) The relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the
United States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) The nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) The presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers
or competitors;
(4) The relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of conduct on
the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) The existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or
defeated by the action; and
(6) The degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies.
1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22 n.170.
1710 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
1" 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-15.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-22 n.169 & S-46 n.286.
184 Id. at S-22 n. 167.
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foreign relations is constitutionally reserved to the Executive
Branch.' 8 5 Therefore, an action by the Justice Department, an arm
of the Executive Branch, cannot be questioned by the Judiciary on
grounds of foreign relations considerations.
The act of state doctrine has been rejected in the majority of
international antitrust cases' 8 6 and the future of the doctrine in gen-
eral has been questioned by the Supreme Court. 187 This may ex-
plain the diplomatic manner by which the Department approaches
the topic.
E. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
The foreign sovereign compulsion defense, described in the
next subsection of the 1988 Guidelines, maintains that a private
company cannot be liable for its acts under the antitrust laws where
its conduct has been compelled by a foreign sovereign.' 8 8 The De-
partment stated in the 1977 Guide's Case L that it recognized the
defense, but with four limitations. First, foreign sovereign compul-
sion only protected foreign government directed activities occurring
in foreign territory, not in the United States.'8 9 This is called the
territorial limitation. Second, the act must have been due to an or-
der by a truly sovereign entity acting within its own laws." 10 Third,
referring back to comity, the balance of national interests must have
been reasonable and, fourth, the response of the private company
must have been reasonable in light of the degree of pressure applied
to it.' 9'
There were several criticisms of this position. First a public pol-
icy in favor of fairness192 to private companies (particularly in light
of possible criminal liability) augurs for a rule of reason approach
versus absolute proscriptions such as the territorial limitation." 93
Second, the fact that there is a wide spectrum of liability facing pri-
vate companies, from civil damages to prospective relief to criminal
sanctions, a flexible set of standards for conduct needs to be ap-
plied. 194 Third, the comity balancing problem is similar to that
under act of state. Actions against private companies which follow
the commands of foreign sovereigns implicitly impune the com-
185 Id. at S-23 n.171.
186 HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at 586.
187 Id. at 581.
188 Id. at 615.
189 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-15.
I '1) Id.
191 Id. at E-15 to E-16.
192 See generally HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at 614-15. See also Interamerican Ref.
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.Del. 1970); United States v.
Field, 532 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
19: HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at 615.
194 Id.
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mands and the foreign sovereigns themselves. 195 Thus the 1977
Guide's poor formulation of comity policy was considered likely to
create more problems than it solved.
The 1988 Guidelines' foreign sovereign compulsion policy uses
similar language to that in the 1977 Guide. Once again, the Depart-
ment recognizes this defense but with two limitations. First a foreign
sovereign must actually and unambiguously compel the conduct.
Second, where conduct has clearly occurred primarily in the United
States, the Department generally will not accept a foreign sovereign
compulsion defense. 196
The second limitation is a slight softening of the Department's
former absolute territorial limitation.' 97 The Department's milder
stance is probably a pragmatic response to complaints by foreign
governments of interference by the United States.' 98
After describing the scope of the doctrine, the 1988 Guidelines
carefully distinguish it from the state action doctrine.' 99 This de-
lineation is not included in the 1977 Guide and is a valuable addition
to the new one. The Department's position is taken wholly from the
Supreme Court's opinion in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States.2 °0 Essentially, the state action doctrine's lower
standard for compulsion of private conduct is driven by considera-
tions of federalism, 21' which obviously are inapplicable to foreign
sovereigns. In addition, the requirement under the state action doc-
trine of "active supervision ' 20 2 would be impossible to enforce in
the international context without interfering with legitimate interests
of foreign sovereigns.203
195 Id. at 616.
196 1988 GUIDE, supa note 1, at S-23. In its draft version of the new guidelines, the
Department had additionally required that the command be within the foreign sovereign's
own legal authority and limited comity to those situations where the foreign sovereign's
acts were reasonably required. 1988 DRAFT, supra note I, at S-14. These are identical to
the second and third limitations in the 1977 Guide.
197 At first blush, this indicates acceptance of the fairness principle, however, in foot-
note 117 of the draft version of the guidelines, the Department stated, "In the absence of
[comity] considerations . . . . abstract and undefined notions of 'fairness' to firms that
engage in anticompetitive conduct should not obstruct the legitimate prosecution of anti-
trust offenses .... ." Id. at n.1 17. That footnote was removed, but may still be the best
statement of DOJ's postition.
198 See supra note 174.
199 The Sherman Act doctrine of state action "embodies the notion that the U.S. Con-
gress should not be presumed to have intended to interfere with the authority of the states
'constitutionally to regulate their domestic commerce.' " 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-23
(citing Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56
(1985)).
200 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
201 HAWK TREATISE, supra note 151, at 619.
202 For domestic private conduct to be protected under the state action doctrine, there
are two requirements. First, the conduct must be pursuant to clearly articulated state poli-
cies and subject to active supervision by the state. Second, the conduct must be actually
compelled by the state.
203 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-23 n.179.
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F. International Trade Friction
In the last subsection of the 1988 Guidelines, the Department
provides its position on a Noerr-Pennington-like doctrine 20 4 applica-
ble in the international context. The stated policy is slightly changed
from the 1977 Guide which took the position in Case N20 5 that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine itself applies internationally.2 0 6 The
1977 Guide listed three exceptions to the defense recognized in do-
mestic cases: (1) sham activity intended to slow competitors without
actually trying to seek government help; 20 7 (2) providing false infor-
mation to gain government help;2 0 8 (3) conspiracy with or bribery of
a regulatory body.20 9 The 1988 Guidelines equivocate on Noerr-
Pennington's direct applicability in the international context,2 10 but
for reasons of comity the Department does not pursue legitimate pe-
titioning of foreign sovereigns by U.S. or foreign firms under circum-
stances in which the U.S. Government protects similar activities. 2 1 1
The guidelines mention the sham exception noted in the 1977
Guide, but omit the other two.2 12 In Case 17 of the 1988 Guide-
lines, 2 13 the Department also describes how trade arbitration agree-
ments are affected by the antitrust laws. In effect, any agreement
among international competitors to raise price or restrict output is
exempt from the antitrust laws only so long as "the agreement is
reached and carried out in accordance with the suspension agree-
ment provisions of the antidumping law."2 1 4
The guidelines go on to outline the basic procedures of the
204 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine asserts that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit
two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or
the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint
or monopoly." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961); accord, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See also
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
205 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-17.
206 The doctrine was formulated in cases of a purely domestic nature, but because the
heart of the issue is the First Amendment right to petition, the doctrine or a very similar
doctrine is believed by some to apply in the international context. HAWK TREArISE, supra
note 151, 609-11. See Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir.
1983). But see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff dper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
207 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-17. First recognized in California Mtotor Transport.
208 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-18. See Woods Expoloration & Producting Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972).
209 1977 GUIDE, supra note 3, at E-18. See California Motor Transport, at 513.
210 1988 GUIDE, supra note 1, at S-24 (citing Occidental, at 107-08 and Coastal States, at
1364-67).
211 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-24.
212 This is makes sense because perjury, bribery, conspiracy, etc. are obviously illegal
under other statutes and therefore intuitively create exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine or any similar doctrine.
213 1988 GUIDE, supra note I, at S-46 to S-47.
214 Id. at S-47.
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Commerce Department but add, "A detailed discussion of the provi-
sions in various U.S. trade laws that allow agreements or other meas-
ures to restrict import competition is beyond the scope of these
Guidelines.- 2 15 This is probably the most serious gap in the new
document. With the explosion of trade laws and regulations in the
1980s, it is becoming important to understand what the Depart-
ment's role is. This is a very complex problem and it is understanda-
ble if the Department feels it is too soon to announce detailed
policies, but follow-up to this guide is needed.
IV. Conclusion
The Department has generally done a good job in describing its
current policies. There are no significant differences between the
new international guidelines and current domestic guidelines for
criminal offenses under the Sherman Act, mergers, and vertical non-
price restraints. Policies for joint ventures and intellectual property
restraints are being liberalized under the new guidelines, but again,
this will probably be as true for purely domestic situations in the fu-
ture as for those involving international operations today. All in all,
there are no significant surprises in the new guidelines.
Nevertheless, the Department has not been as successful in
meeting one of its primary goals: defining safe harbors for business.
For example, the Department has reiterated that mergers which
leave the relevant market with an HHI of less than one thousand will
not be challenged-a fairly objective criterion. Yet there is such a
long list of nebulous ways to measure the relevant market, that busi-
nesses cannot be absolutely certain of the result. The Department
admits that even with the guidelines, there is no substitute for exper-
ienced counsel. 216
The problem may be inherent in the Chicago philosophy which
advocates the generous use of the rule of reason approach. The Rea-
gan Administration intended this to open up the market, to give
business every economic benefit of the doubt. Unfortunately, rule of
reason is a means and not an end. The next administration or some
other future administration can easily interpret rule of reason in a
much stricter fashion as suits whatever ends they may wish to
acheive. Mergers, and to a lesser degree possibly vertical nonprice
restraints, are the most likely candidates for this treatment. Interna-
tional joint ventures may enjoy bipartisan support for several years
to come, but even they will probably face resurgent protectionism or
fears of collusion at some point.
These political realities of antitrust enforcement point out one
major change that should be made to these guidelines as well as
215 Id.
216 Id. at S-I.
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other Department policy statements. As a new administration enters
office, timely notice of changes in policy must be given to the busi-
ness community. Certainly, a full set of guidelines would be too diffi-
cult to produce immediately, but a letter of policy considerations
should be required within six months after a change in administra-
tions. A more complete rewrite of guidelines as necessary should
then be delivered within two years. 2 17 Guidelines are far less useful
when delivered virtually at the end of an administration as occurred
with these guidelines.
A second and much tougher part of the uncertainty problem al-
luded to early in this Comment is the lack of coordinated guidelines
from the various government bodies overseeing international opera-
tions. It would be a tremendous advantage to have a series of linked
policy statements from the FTC, the ITC, and even the States' Attor-
neys General on this topic so that a complete picture can be drawn.
Finally, it is heartening to note that DOJ does not see the guide-
lines as a final answer to business uncertainty. The Department has
proposed limiting private suit damages and other actions which
should minimize the penalty on a business for guessing wrong about
antitrust policy and encourage more international activity.2 1
8
ROBERT G. SHIMP
217 The Justice Department had initially promised to update the Merger Guidelines
every two years. But when asked about a possible revision as the second year anniversary
approached, then Assistant Attorney General Ginsberg stated, "I anticipate that [the
Merger Guidelines] will largely be codified by then." Interview [I'ih ,ssislant Attorney General
Douglas Ginsbuig, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Vol. 50, No. 1247, at 59 (Jan. 9
1986).
218 Thornburgh, supra note 103.
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